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ABSTRACT
THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE HYPOTHESIS AS A PRBOLEMATIC: BEYOND
“FALSIFICATIONANISM”
SEPTEMBER 2018
PAUL DAVID ERB, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS (AMHERST)
Directed by: Professor Dan Clawson
Halfway into its third decade, the debate surrounding the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis
has stalled with political economists and socio-ecologists ascendant and modernization theorists
scrambling to give their apparently moribund perspective new life. But beyond the rise and fall of the EKC,
there remains a second-order question and decades of data: how do the theoretical perspectives of these
contenders shape what their protagonists do and don't see? How have they mistaken episodes of "talking
past each other" for genuine dialogue? Which perspective has had the biggest impact on the other’s way
of thinking? A qualitative and quantitative analysis compares the top-ranking journals in economics with
interdisciplinary journals of environmental economics revealing a categorical divergence in the types of
critical thought deployed in the EKC debate over an almost 15 year period. The few articles appearing in
the top ranking economic journals systematically fail to grasp the fundamentals of ecology which is evident
in both their measurements and conclusions. I offer an abridged discussion of the critiques socio-ecology
presents contemporary economics as what, in Kuhnian terminology, may well be described as a discipline
in the crisis moment of a paradigm shift in no particular direction. I then conclude by siding with Habermas
and Adorno against Popper's ideologically impoverished “falsifactionism”: progress in science depends as
much on a theory of ideological critique as it does on the acquisition of technical knowledge. My intent has
been to argue that ideological critique is empirically possible as the history of thought.
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CHAPTER I
IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OR THE HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF INCOMMENSURABLE THEORIES:
THE EKC AS A PROBLEMATIC

1.1 Introduction
In this paper I consider the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis as a case study to
evaluate its problem (i.e., socio-ecology) instead as a problematic. The problem of the EKC is to
empirically demonstrate whether or not the systemic logic of the commodity form (i.e.,
exponential growth) is compatible with a sustainable environment. In the old-fashioned Marxian
language, the question is whether or not this systemic logic will ultimately become its own barrier
as the ever expanding circuit of capital erodes its reproductive base. This debate has seen political
economists and socio-ecologists face off against modernization theorists for two and a half
decades in the case of the EKC hypothesis in particular, and decades longer more generally. For
reasons concerning the nature of social science, the possibility of predicting the actual course of
events for such a question seems unlikely. Although, this problem still has a crucial role to play
as the stakes of environmental crisis continue to become more, rather than less, evident and
social forecasting maintains the possibility of understanding an historical trajectory without the
philosophical burden of a telos.
By focusing instead on the history of the EKC debate over the last 15 years, we can remain
empirically grounded while asking a second order question investigating if and how alternative
theoretical perspectives operate in incompatible ways. This question moves us beyond trying to
assess which theoretical perspective best explains the evidence (the problem) to that of
evaluating how these alternative theoretical perspectives measure and interpret the same
phenomena incommensurately, and how such a divergence in thought and practice informs the
different conclusions they often reach (the problematic). While I consider a review of the
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development of problematics or ideological critique to be an important exercise, this paper
focuses more narrowly on empirically demonstrating that alternative theoretical perspectives do
in fact structure our critical thought.

2

CHAPTER II
METHODS AND DATA: DECADES OF CRITIQUING THE EKC HYPOTHESIS

2.1 Identifying Alternative Theoretical Perspectives
In order to proceed with such a comparison, we must first identify alternative theoretical
perspectives that might be compared. As I am considering the EKC hypothesis as a case study of
the more general problem of socio-ecology, a viable way forward, it seems to me, is to form a
comparison between those articles published in the most important journals in economics with
those articles published in the interdisciplinary journals of environmental economics. Establishing
a comparison this way does have limitations. For example, where articles are ultimately published
is not a neat result of matching theoretical perspectives with particular journals. In reality, there
is likely a great deal of variation. Furthermore, it is not as if theoretical perspectives are always
explicit or well developed discussions in published articles. Much of this remains implicit. In order
to overcome these concerns, my strategy here is to develop a comparison that is observable
across disciplines. At the level of an interdisciplinary comparison, we should expect the articles
published in journals to conform to those theoretical assumptions which demarcate their
disciplines as such. Practically speaking, we should expect that interdisciplinary journals that
explicitly express interest in both economic and environmental issues should attract a more
developed or intricate understanding of ecology than mainstream economic journals. This is, at
any rate, implied in the very notion of interdisciplinary studies. So while we might expect some
of the random chaos of actuality that is present in any sort of historical comparison, comparing
between disciplines should considerably mitigate the seriousness of this concern and give
credence to my claim that I have a comparison between distinct types of thought with easily
grasped institutionalized differences.
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2.2 The EKC Hypothesis as a Comparison Topic
The EKC hypothesis was proposed by Grossman and Kruger (1995) at the beginning of the
1990s in the context of the debate surrounding NAFTA. After an environmental movement and a
wave of influential socio-ecological literature (e.g., Bookchin, Catton Jr., Schnaiberg) in the
decades immediately preceding Grossman and Kruger's topical thesis, many expressed concern
that liberalizing trade would have an adverse effect on the environment. This was not only
because environmental problems seemed to be the commonsensical result of the growing level
of economic activity, but also because the Trade Agreement lacked an overarching regulatory
program that would prevent the effective export of polluting activities or a potential 'race to the
bottom' in which market pressures allow production to pit environmental regimes against one
another. However, the initial success of the EKC hypothesis was to provide empirical evidence
that as per capita income increased past a certain level, the increase of environmental pollutants
would reach a point of inflection and fall thereafter (i.e., the function of income and
environmental indicators is parabolic). In this way, it could be argued that economic growth was
not actually anathema to a safe environment but a sound strategy for achieving it.
Figure 1: A Graphic Representation of the EKC Hypothesis

I consider the EKC hypothesis to be the best candidate for a topic of comparison for two
reasons. The first reason is that the EKC hypothesis has considerable comparative strengths.
Dating back to the early 1990s, it is perhaps the earliest example of economists empirically
4

confronting the environment systematically. It has also enjoyed significant popularity across
disciplinary boundaries and received a large amount of attention. Though it is mostly addressed
in the interdisciplinary journals of environmental economics its notoriety has ensured that it at
least registers in mainstream economic journals. In addition to its popularity, it is significant
because it faces squarely the question of whether or not capitalism's imperative for
growth/accumulation is irreducibly opposed to the notion of a safe environment and
hypothesizes a comprehensive solution native to existing economic theory. Both the processes
of ecology and economic activity are incredibly abstract processes. The scope of the EKC
hypothesis has the ability to consider both as total processes and not simply as isolated or discrete
instances. With “everything on the table”, this space resists narrowing the common ground
between the disciplines from which the debate over the problematic might be jointly organized.
The second reason for favoring the EKC hypothesis as a topic of comparison is that the
comparison between the interdisciplinary journals of environmental economics and the
mainstream economic journals allows us to recognize that the interdisciplinary journals includes
a wider background of thought and perhaps even formal education outside of economics,
including the general influence of important ideas within socio-ecology.

Hence, we can

reasonably claim to have a clear comparison between types of thought, a contrast of a body of
predominately economic thought against a body of more ecologically informed thought.

2.3 Data Collection
I collected my data in September of 2014 by querying the search term "environmental
Kuznets curve" in ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection1 with limitations set to form a

1

I ended up using ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection on the advice of the social science research librarian
at UMass (Amherst) on account of inconsistent query results from JSTOR, EBSCO, Web of Science, and what could
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comparison between the most influential journals in economics with those of the interdisciplinary
journals of environmental economics.

The most influential journals in economics are

operationalized as the ten journals with the highest impact factors as determined by Journal
Citations Reports, a publication with citation counts for the Web of Science. Since 2000, only eight
articles in these journals have used the EKC search term (see table 1). Of these eight, I excluded
three because they do not substantively address the EKC hypothesis. Kitzmueller et al. (2012)
only mention the EKC once in order to posit that it shares a similar logic with their actual topic,
corporate social responsibility. Toll (2009) is excluded because the EKC search term only appears
in the title of a referenced source and is not actually discussed in his review on the estimated
costs of climate change. Finally, Portney's (2000) contribution is also excluded because the EKC
hypothesis receives a single non-substantive mention throughout the course of his argument that
incentive-based environmental regulations will become the norm by 2050. Because none of these
critically engage with the EKC hypothesis, they cannot be compared across groups with other
articles which do critically engage the comparison topic.
Table 1: Articles from Top 10 Journals

Articles from Top 10 Journals
Journal:
Journal of Economic Literature

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Rank:
1st

4th

Impact Factor: Articles:
Citations:
6.341
Zheng and Kahn (2013)
2
Graff-Zivin and Neidell (2013)
2
Kitzmueller et al. (2012)
10
Copeland and Taylor (2004)
81
4.23
Toll (2009)
68
Dasgupta et al. (2002)
90
Esty (2001)
16
Portney (2000)
4

be found in the archives of the journal's websites. I'm not sure if I will ever again overestimate the capabilities of
what I presumed were standardized search engines.
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In order to form the comparison group of articles in the interdisciplinary journals of
environmental economics, I considered all articles appearing since January 2000 that used the
EKC search term and have been cited more than 100 times in those economic journals which
explicitly express concern for the environment or ecology either in their titles or journal
description. I set the limitation of 100 citations and publications occurring since 2000 in order to
form a manageable and relevant comparison with the articles in mainstream journals. As there
were hundreds of articles published on the topic of the EKC in the interdisciplinary journals,
limiting the selection to those with over 100 citations substantially reduced the number while
maintaining those articles that arguably have had the most influence in shaping their readership's
thought. Because the sample of articles from the top ten journals begins in 2000, I limited the
selection of articles in the comparison group of interdisciplinary journals to this same year.
Following these criteria, the comparison group of articles from interdisciplinary journals contains
eight articles (see table 2).
Table 2: Articles from Interdisciplinary Sample

Articles from Interdisciplinary Sample
Journal:
Journal of Env Econ and Management
Ecological Economics

World Development

Rank: Impact Factor: Articles:
32nd
2.522
33rd

62nd

Citations:

Stern and Common (2001)

133

Soytas and Sari (2009)
Zhang and Cheng (2009)
Soytes et al. (2007)
Cole (2004)
Dinda (2004)
York et al. (2003)

105
117
128
104
279
162

Stern (2004)

401

2.517

1.733

I anticipate that some readers may object that a meaningful comparison is not possible,
that the results of such a comparison will lack significance on account of the limited number of
articles in the mainstream sample which only appear in generalist journals. Similarly, the fact that
7

many of these articles are review articles instead of empirical interventions might raise more
questions about the validity of this comparison. However, these are not problems for the type of
comparison I am making. Recall that my goal is to identify those articles arguably having the most
influence on the way the comparison topic is conceived. From this perspective generalist journals
and review articles are no less important (and arguably more important) than novel empirical
studies in specialty journals.
But there is a more fundamental point: it actually happens to be the case that the
mainstream coverage is limited in this way. There is nothing that prevented authors from making
novel empirical contributions or initiating a lively debate in any of the non-generalist mainstream
journals which are included in this sample. But this did not happen. For an historical method, this
measurement of an “absence” provides us with data that is as empirically relevant as the more
easily available data that conform to the “large-n” criteria favored by positivist methodologies. It
is of course possible to "go where the data is" and analyze only the heterogeneity of the many
available EKC articles in the interdisciplinary journals. But to do so sacrifices the question with
which I began merely to satisfy contemporary sociology's methodological bias towards
positivism2. Accepting that these mainstream journals were also part of the last fifteen years of
the historical actuality which shaped our understanding of the EKC hypothesis, my task is to
develop impartial methods that accurately report mainstream participation. Mainstream journals
are no-less deserving of our critical attention than the interdisciplinary journals. While the
coverage from the mainstream sample is limited, it is nonetheless present, and this serves as
important evidence of a relative absence while still allowing us to evaluate the type of critical
thought accessible in mainstream journals.

2

For a particularly insightful contribution on this score see George Steinmetz's "Odious Comparisons:
Incommensurability, the Case Study, and "Small N's" in Sociology" Sociological Theory 22:3, September 2004.
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2.4 Categories of Critique: Types I and II
An initial reading of the data revealed a predictable divergence in the way in which the
EKC hypothesis was critically approached. In order to test the possibility or degree of a critical
divergence, I centered my evaluation on the critical focus given to the dependent and
independent variables of the EKC function. Recall that the independent variable measures the
economic abstraction 'growth' while the dependent variable measures the ecological abstraction
'environmental quality'.
I decided to classify as a type I critique, all critical efforts focused on the independent
variables of the EKC hypothesis. The basic insight of the type I critique begins with the recognition
that growth is neither static nor homogenous. Instead, this type I critique identifies both
proximate causes (e.g., effects of technique, composition, and scale) as well as underlying causes
(e.g., information transparency, education, regulatory capacity and enforcement) that
dynamically effect how economic activity changes over time. Accordingly, type I critiques identify
those control or independent variables other than income which are often responsible for
improvements in environmental indicators such that environmentally conscious growth may be
possible. The underlying logic of an isolated type I critique is that any and all empirical evidence
of an instance of the EKC is ipso facto evidence of the hypothesized EKC relation.
A type II critique, on the other hand, focuses on the operationalization of the dependent
variable of the EKC hypothesis. The basic insight of the type II critique begins with the recognition
that specific environmental indicators are a single facet of a complex ecological process. Beyond
the task of developing reliable measurements of a given indicator, type II critiques stress that
there remains a second-order question of establishing said measure's relative ecological
importance in relation to a myriad of possible indicators. Accordingly, the task of a type II critique
is to establish that evidence of an improvement in a specific indicator is at the same time evidence

9

of ecological resilience or sustainability. The underlying logic of a type II critique is that any and
all empirical evidence of an instance of the EKC may or may not be evidence of the hypothesized
EKC relation because this depends entirely on how one decides to measure “the environment”.
In many ways this distinction between types of critical thought boils down to the
analytical distinction between environment and ecology. Schnaiberg (1980:9-10) began his
influential book by observing that the adjective “environmental” has become so popular among
scientists that its substantive meaning has been eclipsed by its formal meaning. "Whatever is
outside of the immediate focus of study (the individual, the group, the society) represents its
‘environment’.

Should we follow up on this definition, virtually every problem is an

'environmental problem'."

But rather than abandoning the term altogether, Schnaiberg

recommends that we refine our understanding such that we read 'environment' as the structure
or process of “ecology”. Ecology is the dynamic and generative integration of living and nonliving
systems that yield environments; environments are the product of ecology. "In other words,
ecology examines the whole cloth; the other fields of biology, the threads of nature" that can be
understood in terms of populations, communities, ecosystems, and the biosphere. We might
stress that this includes the behavior--economic or otherwise--of said populations.
As I hope to make clear in this paper, both of these types of critical thought mirror each
other in that they search for the dynamic process beyond the superficial abstractions of 'economic
growth' and 'environmental quality'. My data are analyzed by the type of critique present in the
articles in order to determine if the distribution of these critiques reflects the organization of my
comparison groups (i.e., mainstream economic journals vs. interdisciplinary journals of
environmental economics). This allows me to test whether or not there is evidence of a
divergence in critical thought during the ideological process that organizes the contest of what
“the problem of the environment” should be understood to mean.

10

CHAPTER III
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE EKC HYPOTHESIS AND THE ELISION OF ECOLOGY
IN MAINSTREAM ECONOMICS

3.1 Introduction
My analysis of the comparison topic of the EKC hypothesis between articles in the top-ten
economic journals and the interdisciplinary journals of environmental economics reveals three
facts. Firstly, the coverage of the EKC hypothesis in the top-ten journals is incredibly limited.
Secondly, there is categorical evidence of a divergence in critique type by sample in which all type
II critiques are developed exclusively within the interdisciplinary journals of environmental
economics. Together, these first two facts comprise two absences in the mainstream journals
that are both present in the interdisciplinary journals. Thirdly, all articles agree that the
plausibility of a successful EKC relationship depends on political regulations. Table 3 reports these
distributions by sample.

3.2 Limited Mainstream Coverage
The first point to be made about the articles appearing in the sample of top-ten journals
is the relative paucity of the topic's coverage. Between January 2000 and September 2014 only
five articles were published that substantially address the EKC hypothesis. None empirically apply
the EKC in a novel study. Only three articles (Zheng and Kahn 2013, Copeland and Taylor 2004,
Dasgupta et al. 2002), all of which are review articles, directly address the EKC while the remaining
two (Graff-Zivin and Neidell 2013, Esty 2001) find brief recourse to the EKC in their respective
discussions of the net benefits of environmental regulations and the need for transparency in
trade negotiations. Also of interest, these articles appear exclusively in generalist journals. Eight
of the top ten journals did not publish a single study on the EKC during my almost fifteen year
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period of analysis. These eight journals not addressing the EKC are the journals seen as publishing
the main empirical, mathematical, and theoretical articles in the discipline. The two journals
covering the EKC hypothesis are both seen by economists as generalist journals, intended to be
accessible to economists regardless of specialty, and possibly even to non-economists. The
appropriate sociological comparison would be the appearance of articles in Contexts but not the
American Sociological Review or the American Journal of Sociology.
Not surprisingly, in contrast to the notably limited coverage of the EKC in the first sample,
the coverage in interdisciplinary journals is much higher with hundreds of articles. Using my
sample selection criteria in order to allow for a manageable comparison of the most influential
articles results in a sample of eight. While two of these eight articles are reviews, the remaining
six are empirical contributions. Three articles (Soytas et al. 2007, Soytas and Sari 2009, and Zhang
and Chen 2009) address the so-called emissions-energy-income nexus. Cole (2004) considers the
role of trade in the EKC hypothesis. York et al. (2003) as well as Stern and Common's (2001)
contributions include notable methodological innovations.
Table 3: Distribution of Critiques by Sample

Distribution of Critiques by Sample
Top-ten Journals:
Zheng and Kahn (2013)
Graff and Neidell (2013)
Copeland and Taylor (2004)
Dasgupta et al. (2002)
Esty (2001)

Regulations Type I
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Type II

Interdisciplinary Journals:
Soytas and Sari (2009)
Zhang and Cheng (2009)
Soytas et al. (2007)
Stern (2004)
Cole (2004)
Dinda (2004)
York et al. (2003)
Stern and Common (2001)
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

3.3 Divergence in Critical Thought: Qualitative Analysis
In this section my aim is to document that there are two distinct ways in which
participants of the EKC debate critique its hypothesis. It is my view that these types of critique
are not in existential competition but are both necessary if the relation between economic growth
and ecological change is to be better understood. This is the putative goal of EKC studies. All of
these articles have scientific merit and have made varying degrees of significant and important
contributions to this literature. Nonetheless, I am arguing that a set of authors thinks entirely in
terms of economics when their task is to consider a hypothesis that presents a relation that is in
equal measure about ecology. This is a problem. My best guess is that those authors whose work
I review would not disagree with my analysis which I don't believe is controversial. Why? Because
their collective works accept that the abstraction of “per capita income” is inappropriate for
considering the dynamics that underlie an incredibly heterogeneous process. There is no single
type of economic growth. But still, when they turn towards “environmental quality” they fail to
criticize it in the same way, almost until the point where one wonders if they appreciate that it
too represents a dynamic process, that there is no single measurement that captures its
complexity, that “pollutants” most certainly aren't the best indicator of such a measurement, and
that the “essence” of ecology is complete endogeneity, to suggest a term familiar to
econometricians.
In this section I will qualitatively consider three of the most important articles from each
sample at the level of their structure, overall focus, and conclusions. I have selected these six
articles in consideration of space and because they are the most representative. The articles
excluded from the interdisciplinary sample do not include type II critiques and, having noted the
heterogeneity in this sample, are not necessary to review at length. The articles excluded from
the mainstream sample also conform to the general trend of exclusively thinking in terms of type
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I critiques, but they all offer a less direct focus on the EKC hypothesis and make weaker
comparisons for this reason. All six articles considered in the section are the highest cited from
their samples, with the exception of Zheng and Kahn (2013) which is also notable for its much
later date of publication. For reasons of clarity I have organized their presentation by sample and
begin with the mainstream sample which develops exclusively type I critiques. The presentation
of the interdisciplinary sample follows where type II critiques are highlighted.

3.3.1 Broaching Type II Critiques
Dasgupta et al. (2002:147-8) represent the earliest article from my sample of mainstream
journals. Their contribution is structured around consideration of the EKC's critics: "[s]ome
pessimistic critics argue that cross-sectional evidence for the environmental Kuznets curve is
nothing more than a snapshot of a dynamic process." This clearly broaches type II critiques. The
authors recognize that the problem with the EKC hypothesis is that it lacks dynamism, that it
assumes a narrow focus. In good scientific fashion, they set out to evaluate the pessimist's claims
which they divide into two groups: the “new toxins” and the “race to the bottom” group.
According to Dasgupta et al. (2002) the new toxins group cautions that "even if certain pollutants
are reduced as income increases, industrial society continuously creates new, unregulated and
potentially toxic pollutants" (Dasgupta et al. 148). Our authors do not identify any references
exemplifying the “new toxins” group, so it is hard to say if their scope is as ecologically
impoverished as the one Dasgupta et al. (2002) attribute to them or if this is a significant
misreading of the pessimists on their part. But it is clear from their own work that without
exception Dasgupta et al. (2002:150) conflate or reduce “pollutants” and “toxins” as the only
possible way of measuring the EKC's dependent variable of “environmental quality”. Even when
they recognize that the data they use are poor (e.g., when they claim that "for many pollutants
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data is scarce everywhere"), they never escape the strictures of this narrow measurement and
consider only pollutants, ranging from the well know air and water contaminants to the more
diverse and potentially “new toxins” including: carcinogenic organic chlorine compounds,
persistent organic pollutants like PCBs, dioxins, DDT and other pesticides, and toxic pollutants. As
we will soon see, such conflations don't survive type II critiques.
Returning to the other pessimists under their consideration, the “race to the bottom”
group, we see that Dasgupta et al. (2002) clearly understand the formal economic dynamics. As
is well known in the literature, proponents of the “race to the bottom” analysis caution that the
appearance of EKCs in actuality might only be structural change driven by globalization and
comparative advantage.

With comparatively lower environmental standards developing

economies can produce dirty goods cheaper which incentivizes the displacement of this
production in developed countries where environmental standards make it more costly and less
competitive internationally. These pessimists caution that, absent an overarching environmental
regulatory regime, environmentally dangerous production can pit politically fractured states
against each other in search of the most competitive (least regulated) possible conditions of
production: a “race to the bottom”.
While the validity of this argument certainly requires empirical verification, the problem
with Dasgupta et al.'s (2002) analysis is simply that it lacks an understanding of the formal
ecological dynamics. The “race to the bottom” is evaluated exclusively in terms of data that
reduces the entire dynamic process of ecology to the aggregation of well-known air and water
pollutants in urban areas. Perhaps it is the case that these are the only existing studies that
conform to “large-n” positivist analysis and that this is therefore the most readily available data.
But even then, Dasgupta et al. (2002) fail even to mention this convolution and its likely
significance for EKC studies in general and their own analysis in particular.
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Absent even a basic ecological understanding, Dasgupta et al. (2002) conclude that the
empirical evidence supports the more optimistic claim (contra the pessimists) that the EKC is
peaking sooner than was conventionally believed practicable, and that environmental quality is
improving with lower income levels. This more optimistic scenario has been possible, they argue,
because of the primary role played by environmental regulation, the benefits of economic
liberalization, the pervasiveness of informal regulations between communities and producers, as
well as access to better information. This may well be true. But there remains the important type
II question: how would their analysis change if instead of considering only well-known air and
water pollutants concentrated in urban areas, the studies they considered included indicators
more representative of ecological change? Here, in the earliest EKC study from the mainstream
sample, we find both evidence of the absence of type II critiques as well as a conclusion validating
the existence of the generalized EKC hypothesis.
In Copeland and Taylor (2004) we find a truly insightful mainstream article the chief defect
of which is that their critical efforts are directed entirely towards investigating the dynamics of
“economic growth” while totally ignoring the problem of measuring the dynamics of the
hypothesis's dependent variable, “environmental quality”. Their understanding of the general
problem is commendable. They begin by noting that "the debate has often been unproductive
because the parties differ greatly in their trust of market forces and typically value the
environment differently" even to the point of lacking "a common language" (Copeland and Taylor
2004:7). They assert skepticism about a simple or predictable relationship between income and
environmental quality and aim to move the conversation beyond the results of the existing
models of per capita income and environmental quality. As they see it, the problem is that EKC
models are often uncontroversial as far as “stylized facts” may go, but are open to various
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theoretical interpretations because they say so little (or so many conflicting things) when their
findings are analyzed.
For this reason Copeland and Taylor (2004:8) develop their own model which features "a
simple pollution demand-and-supply system linking pollution levels to national characteristics
(income, factor endowments, and technologies) and trading opportunities (comparative
advantage and current trade restrictions)". It also includes measures of the three important
effects in the EKC literature. Effects of scale consider how scaling the economy increases every
aspect of it, while effects of composition and technique consider the structural changes that
follow major transitions (typically categorized as primary agricultural, secondary industrial,
tertiary information and service economies) as well as technical innovations. Because scaling up
the economy only increases the environmental impact of economic activity while the structural
changes often significantly reduce this impact, the important question has been whether or not
their dynamic interaction is best characterized by structural changes overtaking scalar change. As
we have just seen in Dasgupta et al (2002), another central topic in the EKC literature concerns
the global composition of economic activities, not isolated and individual states. In other words,
the explanatory power of an effect of composition for an EKC could appear locally but simply be
the result of transitioning from an industrial to a service economy if consumption patterns remain
by replacing domestically produced goods with imported goods. Hence, Copeland and Taylor's
(2004) model allows for a more nuanced look at the structure of economic activity.
However, in Copeland and Tayor's (2004) model we quickly find that “environmental
quality” is reduced entirely to two measurements of emissions: "Z=pollution emissions" and
"e=emission intensity of production". Now to be fair, Copeland and Taylor (2004:10) are at least
dimly aware of this limitation as they concede in foot-note five that: "One large omission from
our review is any explicit discussion of renewable or nonrenewable resource use and
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sustainability. For many in the developing world, the status of fish stocks, aquifers, and forests
are key environmental indicators, but an analysis of trade's impact on resource use would take us
too far afield." This statement doesn't admit the full complexity and dynamics of ecology (any
more than their improved model does for economic growth), but it is clear that their critical
energies have been entirely one-sided as they have taken us a considerable distance away from
the static measurement “per capita income” but still employ a model which expects that
“environmental quality” should be captured in the static, homogenous and easily quantifiable,
"unit of pollution" available for "the private sector's marginal valuation" (Copeland and Taylor
2004:14). It is also worth emphasizing that although they suggest that ecological concerns "take
us too far afield", a type II critique would recognize that they are equally important in evaluating
the legitimacy of the EKC's hypothesized relation. However, save their fifth footnote and a couple
of scattered comments observing the often severe scarcity of data and the fact that "current work
has looked at only a very few pollutants, and there is very little empirical work assessing the
effects of trade on renewable resources", anything broaching, not to mention developing, an
ecological understanding of the problem is categorically absent (Copeland and Taylor 2004:66).
In addition to the admission that type II critiques are not considered and probably should
be, we also find Copeland and Taylor (2004) advancing a more complex conclusion about the
validity of the generalized EKC hypothesis. While Dasgupta et al. (2002) felt confident concluding
that the hypothesized relation both existed and was following a more optimistic scenario,
Copeland and Taylor (2004) appear much more conflicted in their statements. While they claim
that the legacy of the EKC includes having "debunked the commonly held view that environmental
quality must necessarily decrease with economic growth", that there is a "great deal of evidence
supporting the view that rising incomes affect environmental quality in a positive way", they also
conclude that "[s]ince the studies define environmental outcomes quite narrowly, we should be
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wary of claiming too much", that they are "skeptical about the existence of a simple and
predictable relation between pollution and per-capita income" Copeland and Taylor
(2004:23,66,54,8).
These statements are contradictory if one wishes to hold on to the original thesis that
economic growth is compatible with a safe environment because their relation generally follows
the environmental Kuznets curve. In the absence of the generalized hypothesis it is problematic
to argue that evidence of only some of the very few indicators we measure following the EKC
hypothesis has "debunked" anything. It remains an open question whether or not all the
unmeasured indicators of environmental quality validate or invalidate the general hypothesis. If
the weak claim is all we have (i.e., that at least the concentration of well-known pollutants in
urban water supplies and the air can get better as growth proceeds), the hypothesis is limited as
a policy prescription. At any rate, where Dasgupta et al. (2002) spoke with confident optimism
that the EKC existed and was improving faster than anticipated, Copeland and Taylor (2004) spoke
with cautious optimism. And here again we find more evidence of a decidedly type I critical
engagement in the mainstream sample which offers ambiguous support for an increasingly
complex EKC relation.
Finally, Zheng and Kahn (2013) consider the environmental consequences of the last
couple decades of spectacular growth in China. Their contribution also appears in the mainstream
sample. They carefully note that they are considering only localized air and water pollutants and
not the more general problems of climate change. While they acknowledge that various authors
can point to examples of these air and water pollutants which support the EKC hypothesis, they
unambiguously state that they do not consider it to be a unique or predictive law of motion (Zheng
and Khan 2013:733). As they understand it, their main contribution is to look beyond the
abstraction of “per capita income” and to focus on underlying causes of successful instances of
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the EKC hypothesis. These include: the rising middle class demand for a better quality of life by
way of greener cities, increased information transparency that encourages the accountability of
governments and firms, endogenous technological change, and the inclusion of sustainability as
a performance criterion for assessing local politicians. Looking at the model they present as
characterizing EKC studies, again we see that “environmental quality” is measured exclusively as
the abstraction of “emissions control”.
In an important paragraph for this paper, Zheng and Kahn (2013:749) summarize their
work: "Throughout this section, we have focused on how China's urban growth affects local
environmental quality but many externalities feature degradation of regional and global public
goods. For example, the creation of greenhouse gas emissions is a global public good." In this
section they also reference Wackernagel's “ecological footprint”, a measurement of sustainability
that translates environmental impacts into the amount of land needed to offset those flows. In
other words, much like Copeland and Taylor (2004), they acknowledge the one-sidedness of their
intervention but go a bit further by making explicit reference to an approach that would make
EKC studies considerably more ecological in depth and, hence, more significant. But here, again,
we find evidence within the mainstream sample of type I critiques as well as something new for
this sample: an unambiguous acknowledgement invalidating the generalized relation
hypothesized by the EKC.
In all three of these most important mainstream engagements with the EKC hypothesis,
we see that type II critiques are variously broached, but are never pursued as central in their own
right. Consistently, the abstraction of “environmental quality” is accepted uncritically while the
authors' critical energies seek to clarify the heterogeneity lying beyond the abstraction of “per
capita income”. This despite the fact that the rise and fall of the environmental Kuznets curve
depends on the relation between both of these two abstractions. Considered chronologically,
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we see that the status of a generalized EKC relation receives strong support in Dasgupta et al.
(2002), is regarded ambivalently with Copeland and Taylor (2004), and is explicitly rejected in
Zheng and Kahn (2013). But if the mainstream sample merely broaches type II critiques while
developing type I critiques, what does it look like to develop a type II critique? To answer this
question, we now turn to the interdisciplinary sample.

3.3.2 Developing Type II Critiques
The problem for York et al. (2003), who published one of the earliest articles in the
interdisciplinary sample, is methodological: according to ecological consensus humans have
dramatically changed the environment since industrialization in terms of the alteration of the
chemical composition of the atmosphere, global changes in land coverage, alterations of major
biogeochemical cycles, and a greatly accelerated rate of species extinction. While impact
identities have existed for a number of decades, the challenge has been to model these impact
equations in order to allow for hypothesis testing. Their solution is STIRPAT (the stochastic
impacts by regression on population, affluence, and technology) with measurements of ecological
elasticity. This model not only allows for hypothesis testing, but is able to measure "the
responsiveness or sensitivity of environmental impacts to a change in any of the driving forces"
(York et al. 2003:354). They argue that this better equips policy makers to face the challenges of
ecology in the 21st century.
Their data suggest that changes in population result in proportional (i.e., unit elastic)
changes in both carbon emissions and energy footprints (a composite measurement of the
amount of productive land needed to service the absorption of carbon emissions, as well as the
land area associated with nuclear power, hydropower, and fuel wood energy). The other major
driver, affluence, is the independent variable of the EKC hypothesis. For carbon emissions, their
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model suggests that lower levels of per capita income are elastic but become inelastic after $2900,
though total emissions are implied to continue an inelastic rise until per capita income reaches
$61,000. Because this figure lies far outside the range of observable income levels, the function
is practically monotonic. In other words, if there is a carbon EKC it would appear to be out of
reach. Similarly, the model also suggests that the energy footprint is also a monotonic function
of affluence. However, the key difference is that changes in income are associated with an
inelastic increase for income levels below $22,850, but thereafter they increase elastically. In
other words, the amount of land needed to service energy demands increases monotonically and
at an increasing rate for every dollar after this inflection point. This is the exact opposite of the
EKC hypothesis.
This is clear theoretical evidence of a type II critique as they begin not with the problem
of investigating what lies beyond the abstraction of “per capita income”, but with the ecological
consensus that human activity is a driving force of ecological change. Furthermore, unwilling to
accept the static abstraction of localized air and water “pollutants” they use indexed “energy
footprints” which more accurately reflects the dynamic complexity of ecology. Finally, York et al.
(2003) empirically apply their model which suggest that, whatever heterogeneous activity lies
beyond the abstraction of “per capita income”, it along with population are the major drivers of
carbon emissions and energy footprints. Here, in the earliest article from the interdisciplinary
sample we find evidence of both type II critiques as well as a conclusion invalidating the existence
of the generalized EKC hypothesis.
Dinda's (2004:432) interdisciplinary contribution also exemplifies type II critiques in that
the structure and focus of his review is to highlight that "[a]n Environmental Kuznets Curve reveals
how a technically specified measurement of environmental quality changes as the fortunes of a
country or a large human community change." In other words, Dinda (2004) presents different
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reasons for why the hypothesized EKC relation should not be considered to have generalized
applicability which focus on the specification of “environmental quality”. He argues that this is
the case for a number of reasons. For example, major indicators of environmental degradation
rise monotonically. Observed instances of the EKC relation are generally limited to localized urban
air and water indicators that cause immediate impacts and do not extend to globalized indicators
with less immediate environmental impacts. Still other indicators rise, fall, and rise again
revealing an “N” (as opposed to inverted-U) shaped curve. Unlike other studies that mildly
acknowledge these problems in scattered qualifications to their central conclusion that the EKC
exists, Dinda (2004) systematically organizes these critiques towards the conclusions that: 1) the
EKC is one of many possible scenarios that an environmental indicator and economic growth could
follow, and 2) determining its generalized applicability necessitates grappling with some decidedly
ecological questions. For example,
1. is the EKC hypothesis valid for all types environmental indicators?
2. is it permanent?
3. is it valid for both individual countries and the world?
4. does it follow a sustainable development path?
Dinda (2004:448-50) concludes his survey by elaborating some important type II critiques:
Empirical studies have mostly used absolute measures of pollution like amount of
emission or pollution rather than a relative measure (like pollution or emission per
unit of output or per square kilometer, etc.)
[T]he concept of EKC cannot be applied to all the environmental factors. For
example, land use change and/or biodiversity loss, which are irreversible, are
conceptually different from air or water pollution.
Using environmental degradation index (EDI) and an appropriate measure of
economic development (i.e., Human Development Index [HDI]), one can develop
a global EKC model. It should be noted that empirical support for the existence of
a global EKC for CO2 emissions has not been found.
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The non-availability of actual data on environmental quality is the major
limitation of all EKC studies. Truly speaking, environmental quality is something
that is not easy to be measured accurately. Therefore, an index of environmental
quality, which could be a better measurement, should be developed and used to
examine the EKC hypothesis.
More structural forms may warrant exploration, for some interdependence in our
environmental indicators is probable. For example, use of pesticide may destroy
useful insects or micro-organisms (and thus hamper soil fertility) or threaten bird
species, but this kind of interdependence remains yet to be explored.
All of these critiques drive at Dinda's (2004:450) most basic point: "[W]e need economic models,
which properly reflect the physical and ecological basis of economic activity, and important
feedback between the economy and the environment." Here, we find evidence of another article
from the interdisciplinary sample that both consistently develops type II critiques as well as
invalidates the existence of the generalized relation hypothesized by the EKC.
The brunt of Stern's (2004:1420) interdisciplinary critical engagement with the EKC is
classifiable as type I. Stern's main argument is that when the proper diagnostic statistic and
specification tests are applied "we find that the EKC does not exist", that the actual hypothesized
relation often varies considerably, and that many emissions and flows of waste rise
monotonically. However, his critical engagement also includes type II critiques. For example,
Stern (2004:1426) highlights the theoretical significance of incorporating an environmental
indicator that estimates the total impact of economic activity and references two studies that
have done this by way of “total energy use”. Both authors found that this measure rises
monotonically with per capita income.

Finally, Stern (2004:1426) clearly grasps the

interconnected nature of ecology:
Economic activity is inevitably environmentally disruptive in some way. Satisfying the
material needs of people requires the use and disturbance of energy flows and material
stocks. Therefore, an effort to reduce some environmental impacts may just aggravate
other problems.
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Here again, we find more evidence of type II critiques in the interdisciplinary sample invalidating
the existence of a generalized EKC hypothesis.
In all three of these most important interdisciplinary engagements with the EKC
hypothesis, we see that type II critiques are not merely broached, but often the central focus of
the article. Consistently, the abstraction of “environmental quality” is critically problematized in
order to consider the second order question of whether or not a given indicator of environmental
quality is simultaneously an ecologically fit measurement of change. Unlike the mainstream
sample which slowly drifted away from support of a generalized EKC relation, the interdisciplinary
sample consistently concluded against the generalized relation whenever type II critiques were
present.

3.3.3 Comparing Their References
If we can provide evidence of this divergence in critical thought by comparing the
structure, focus, and conclusions of the articles from the two samples, should we not also expect
that this divergence exists in their reading or understanding of the references they cite? By and
large a comparison of the 30 references shared across samples by a total of three or more authors
does not reveal any significant evidence of radically divergent interpretations of sources. For the
most part, referenced articles are read very similarly, often with only insignificant variations in
emphasis. In Appendix I, I present a detailed consideration of the two examples of shared
references with the broadest range of interpretation across samples: Stern and Common (2001)
and Arrow et al. (1995). But again, they are not revelatory to this paper's thesis.
So is it worth pursuing these types of comparisons? There might be further evidence of
the origin of this divergence in critical thought in the alternative interpretation of shared
references between dyads (so far I have only considered triads and quadrads). Or, perhaps, the
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evidence explaining why their critical engagement varies is in the isolated references cited by
individual articles. Perhaps.
But I expect the answer to this type of question just as easily lies beyond our ability to
positively pin down. For example, maybe some authors spent more time reading and thinking
about the ecological side of the EKC's hypothesized relation. Possibly some authors enjoyed the
benefit of a liberal education which included a proper introductory class in ecology that was left
to the care of an exceptional instructor. There are likely innumerable scenarios that could explain
this divergence with equal plausibility, but I am not sure they could be demonstrated and do not
believe their discovery would represent a significant contribution to this paper.

3.4. Divergence in Critical Thought: Quantitative
In this section I bolster my argument that there is a non-random distribution of critical
thought by sample using a more quantitative approach to the content analysis of my data. Turning
to the article's references, I ask whether or not we find a higher ratio of articles from
environmental journals in the sample of interdisciplinary thought. If this happens to be the case,
this would help to explain why it is only in this sample that we find evidence of ecological thought
via type II critiques. The logic being: the more one reads journals that express an explicit interest
in the environment, the more sensitive we might expect them to be to a basic and consistent
framework of ecological thought. My second question quantifies the frequency of different terms
used to reference to the dependent variable of the EKC hypothesis (i.e., “the environment”) in
order to determine if there is a non-random distribution in these terms. If my argument is correct,
we should expect to find evidence that terms more ecologically indicative are concentrated in the
interdisciplinary sample. More detailed tables are included in appendix II.
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Table 4: Ratio of Environmental Journal References to non-Environmental Journal References
(Abridged)
Ratio of Environmental Journal References to non-Environmental Journal References by Sample Articles (Abridged)
Interdisciplinary Sample with Type II Critiques:
York et al. (2003)
Dinda (2004)
Stern (2004)
Mainstream Sample without Type II Critiques:
Dasgupta et al. (2002)
Copeland and Taylor (2004)
Zheng and Kahn (2013)

Ratio of Enviornmental Journal Articles to
Total References:

Ratio of Environmental Journal Articles to Total
Journal Articles:

0.30
0.44
0.41

0.47
0.66
0.58

0.30
0.17
0.14

0.52
0.26
0.20

Across articles and samples we see that roughly two-thirds of references are from
journals. The other third is generally reports, conference papers, books, and the occasional news
article. Listing all of the unique journals that appear allows us to group them as environmental or
not. This can be determined by their titles or by reading the descriptions on their websites.
Comparing the number of unique journals referenced doesn't reveal strong confirmation of a
pattern. Comparing the total number of references from environmental journals in each article
reveals some evidence that the interdisciplinary samples has a stronger showing. Finally, when
we compare the ratios of environmental journal articles to total references and total journal
references, we see that the interdisciplinary sample references environmental journals more,
almost without exception.
Table 5: Frequency of Selected Terms (Abridged)

Frequency of Select Terms (Abridged)
ratio of terms to pages
"pollution" "environmental quality" etc.* "indicators" "ecology"
Interdisciplinary Sample:
York et al. (2003)
0.07
0.93
0.60
1.33
Dinda (2004)
4.96
5.04
1.38
0.17
Stern (2004)
3.00
1.65
0.45
0.00
Mainstream Sample:
Copeland and Taylor (2004)
9.44
0.75
0.03
0.00
Dasgupta et al. (2002)
6.95
1.14
0.10
0.00
Zheng and Kahn (2013)
3.44
0.56
0.22
0.07
* in addition to "quality" the following terms are included: degradation, pressure, improvement,
impact, consequences, harm, outcomes, damage, risks, concerns, hazards
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In table 5 selected terms are presented in order to determine whether or not they are
randomly distributed. All of these terms are used to reference the same thing: the EKC
hypothesis's dependent variable (i.e., the environment). The first term, “pollution” (and all
derivations from its root “pollut-“) is by far the narrowest abstraction for conceptualizing the
measurement of the dependent variable.

The second list of terms shorthanded as

“environmental quality” represents a level of abstraction less narrow than pollution and hence
conceptually more open to ecologically fit measurements of the dependent variable. Likewise,
“Indicator/s” is also more conceptually open to ecologically fit measurements than “pollution”.
Finally, “ecology” (and all derivations from its root “ecolog-“) is the term most open to
conceptualizing the fullness of the dependent variable. Comparing the incidences and ratios (i.e.,
incidence : number of pages in an article) across samples, we see that there is an identifiable trend
to use terms more inclusive to ecological thought or expression in the interdisciplinary sample.
While I do not consider the evidence presented in either of tables four and five to be definitive,
they are notable within the context of the earlier qualitative analysis, the basic argument from
which they tend to bolster.

3.5 Divergence in Critical Thought: Conclusion
As was the case with the first finding, this, my second finding, has also been characterized
by a further “absence”. Largely absent from the mainstream sample is the development of any
type II critiques. In this sample we see that type II critiques are broached, misunderstood, and
even acknowledged, but never do we see an active or sustained critical engagement with the
environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis's dependent variable. Turning to the interdisciplinary
sample, we find that type II critiques are both central to the structure, focus, and conclusions of
their articles. They are even developed and applied in novel studies. While I consider this
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qualitative analysis of the article's structure and problem to be the most revealing and direct
exposition of this divergence in critical thought, a quantitative analysis of key terms also bolsters
this general finding. Hence, we find evidence of a non-random distribution of critical thought that
correlates with the sample grouping.

3.6 The Political-Economic Nature of Successful EKCs
Finally, every single article sampled agreed that the viability of an EKC relationship
depends on extra-market regulatory regimes, that successful instances of the relation are not the
automatic result of the regulatory regime of liberalized markets. Although discussion on policy,
regulatory capacity, and enforcement are discussed throughout most articles, direct statements
of the importance of political regulations are sometimes made as well. For example, in the
mainstream, Dasgupta et al. (2002:152,163) write that:
However the available evidence suggest that regulation is the dominant factor in
explaining the decline in pollution as countries grow beyond middle-income status.
If per capita income and environmental quality are to increase together, developing
countries will require effective regulatory capabilities.

While Dinda (2004:439,442) states categorically in the interdisciplinary sample that
Pollution grows unless environmental regulation in strengthened.

Stern (2004:1421), also from the interdisciplinary sample, notes that regulation has long been
established as part of the general EKC logic:
at higher levels of development, structural change towards information-intensive
industries and services, coupled with increased environmental awareness, enforcement of
environmental regulations, better technology and higher environmental expenditures,
result in leveling off and gradual decline of environmental degradation (Panayotou, 1993,
p. 1).

Again, in the mainstream sample, Copeland and Taylor (2004:8) note:
Moreover, there are strong indicators that this income effect works because increases in
the stringency of environmental regulation accompany higher per-capita incomes.
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CHAPTER IV
A DISCIPLINE IN CRISIS?

4.1 A Postpositivist Paradigmatic Shift
When we consider the problem of the environment represented by the case study of the EKC
hypothesis, we find ourselves at something of a dead end. At the moment, decades of empirical
and theoretical debates have seen modernization theorists steadily losing ground and struggling
to re-invent themselves. As Perz (2007) has pointed out, this continuity has been almost entirely
limited to the development of social theories about the environment. My own review of the EKC
literature suggests that it is losing ground and struggling on this newer front as well. Faced with
a situation in which the debate appears to have stalled without a decisive victory, my strategy has
been to attempt to consolidate what we can learn about our competing theoretical perspectives
by evaluating this history as a problematic. While this task lies beyond the immediate scope of
this paper and should be accompanied with a proper review of ideological critique, the findings
of this paper do indicate the importance of such a project. Consider the three basic findings:

1. the economic literature associated with the discipline's orthodoxy has all but
ignored the problem of the environment presented in the case of the EKC
hypothesis (i.e., economists most robust theory of economy and environment);
2. where the EKC debate has been engaged in mainstream journals, critical thought
has systematically mischaracterized the nature of the problem by failing to
understand the foundational principles of ecology;
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3. all of the authors reviewed here agreed that extra-economic or political
regulations are necessary for the improvement of environmental indicators (i.e.,
the market doesn't mysteriously self-regulate this problem).

Finding (3) highlights the well know political-economic contradiction which raises
questions about the possibility and meaning of an independent science of economics. Simply put,
what scientific knowledge stipulates when some category of human behavior should be governed
by economic organizational regimes and when others should be governed by extra-economic
organizational regimes? This is not a simple question. But in spite its foundational importance
for the progression of the discipline of economics, it rarely even registers as a topic of passing
concern. As we begin to understand the timely importance and complex interrelation of
economic and ecologic processes, finding (3) gives us secure empirical grounding for investigating
the foundations of economic knowledge.
Superficially, finding (2) isn't incredibly revelatory. We should intuitively expect that
economist and ecologists will approach a problem that concerns them both from the different
perspectives of their disciplines. The importance of finding (2) is more general. Economists need
to recognize economic behavior as having a constitutive role within the ecological process. In
light of the debate over the legitimacy of the EKC hypothesis, it has become increasingly difficult
to even entertain that old positivist orthodoxy that viewed the science of economics as some fully
formed universal knowledge isolated from the rest of reality. Post neoclassical economists face a
serious question: how is disciplinary progress to proceed absent its organizational paradigm which
has been roundly critiqued but nonetheless remains the orthodoxy? In Kuhnian terms, the
discipline finds itself in a crisis but without a well-defined alternative paradigm towards which to
shift. Instead, we find fractured critiques coming from the whole of the social and behavioral
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sciences: psychological economics, the regulation or historical schools of economics, new political
economists, institutional economics, as well as long standing sociological and anthropological
critiques.
I believe considering the problems facing economic theory from the vantage of socioecology builds upon all of these critiques while revealing the extent of the crisis at new depths.
For example, having acknowledged the possibility that our economic activity may be eroding the
base from which it reproduces itself, how can we ignore the categorical absence in equilibrium
theory for the objective dimension of our values?

Theorizing value exclusively with the

marginalist theory of value doesn't allow space for the recognition of the reflexivity of our action.
In reality it has become clear that our subjective valuations play a role in constituting our
environment which shapes the possibility of all future valuations. This is most striking when
considering the possibility that the imperative of exponential growth could be approaching
natural limitations. When we insist that economics return from the celestial clouds of some
allegedly completed science and reconcile itself with the objective history its subjective theory
helps constitute, we are faced with the challenge of retooling disciplinary terms like “efficiency”
and “value” to recognize imperatives other than growth, imperatives (like ecology) which are
presupposed by even the most narrowly technical definitions of these terms.
Finally, finding (1) suggests the up-hill battle facing this important process of
interdisciplinary critique. Economists have their autonomy and can achieve a high degree of
isolation from critiques that do not arise internally from their own institutionalized knowledge
and practice. However, we are fortunate enough to find the topic of the EKC hypothesis broached
in mainstream journals as well as the much more lively discussions in the interdisciplinary
journals. This is crucial as it allows us to engage with a recognized literature and avoid being
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charged as mere polemicists. But this also underscores the importance of the university as a place
which needs to value more than technical knowledge.
This has long been recognized as the providence of the philosophy of science. We may
be tempted to remember the Copernican revolution as a mere paradigm shift that happened
more or less inexorably with the accumulation of contradictions in the geocentric model of the
cosmos (i.e., as a shift between technical understandings). But Kant was wise to claim his own
'Copernican revolution' in recognition of what this great perspective shift tells us about the
structure of thought, the process of critique, and the dialectical role of reason.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the development and practice of
critique in philosophy, the basic argument is worth broaching. Since Kuhn it has been widely
recognized that the process of science is necessarily a social process. But the importance of
critique continues to lag behind that of the acquisition of the technical understandings in the
sciences. Put simply, the thesis is that the progress of science requires both the acquisition of
imperfect technical understandings as well as a theory of ideological critique that is able to reason
between incommensurable understandings. Elsewhere, I advocate the ontological turn of the
critical realists as the most mature development in this direction of a postpositivist science.
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CHAPTER V
THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE IN POSTPOSITIVIST SCIENCE

5.1 Beyond Falsificationism
In an understudied debate that saw the critical realists (Adorno and Habermas) square off against
the critical rationalists (Popper and Albert), the question of critique took center stage.3 They
disputed the question of how the process of critique should be understood. In reversing the
positivist traditions of verificationism, Popper had famously argued that for a hypothesis to be
scientific it must be falsifiable, that there must be experimental designs that could prove the
theory wrong. In considering the EKC hypothesis I have argued that this particular hypothesis has
frustrated the logic of Popper’s falsificationism because whether or not a given study validated or
falsified the hypothesis appeared to depend on the theoretical perspective employed. Different
theoretical perspectives measured the same phenomena differently and these different measures
often informed the conclusion of the experimental design. It was precisely in this sense that
Adorno and Habermas critiqued Popper's notion of critique as ideologically naive and insisted
upon a theory of ideological critique. In Habermas's words:
He [Popper] rightly discredits every form of primary knowledge, but even mistakes can only be found
to be such on the basis of criteria of validation. For their justification we must adduce arguments;
but where then are we to look for these if not in precisely that dimension--not of the origin but
namely of the formation of knowledge--which has been ruled out? Otherwise the standards of
falsification remain arbitrary....He assumes the epistemological independence of facts from the
theories which should descriptively grasp these facts and the relations between them. Accordingly,
tests examine theories against "independent" facts. This thesis is the pivot of the positivistic
problematic which Popper still retains. (quoted in Giddens 1974:19)

My strategy in this paper has been to move beyond the pragmatic problem presented by
the EKC hypothesis and to argue that it is more productive to confront it instead as a problematic.

3

The main contributions in this debate have been collected, translated (by Glyn Adey and David Frisby), and
published as The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology: Theodor W. Adorno et al. (1976) Heinemann Educational
Books, London
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By documenting a divergence in critical thought between alternative theoretical perspectives, I
have argued (contra Popper) that accepting thought as spontaneous is in principle unscientific
and have instead argued (à la Adorno and Habermas) that ideological critique is as central to the
progress of any science as is the acquisition of its technical knowledge.
Beyond falsificationism remains the task of systematically incorporating ideological
critique into postpositivist science. In the case of the dispute between the critical theorists and
critical rationalists, the critical theorists’ point was that postpositivist science must overcome
positivism’s scientism and recognize the role of negative dialectics in revealing the limits of
knowledge. The inability of the scientific methods of 19th century naturalism to comprehend the
dimensions of social-psychology does not entail that these questions are in principle unscientific.
If we instead follow the critical realist thesis of epistemological relativity, the ontological natures
of these domains of reality only imply various natural limitations that determine the form of the
possible science. Indeed, on the critical realist view, the intelligibility of any scientific activity and
coherent conception of naturalism requires just such a concept of an ontological depth. In such
a case, the critical realist practice of “explanatory critique” may hold some promise towards this
end of elaborating a postpositivist sociological science.
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APPENDIX A:
Comparing References
Dinda (2004), Stern (2004), and Copeland and Taylor (2004) all include Stern and Common (2001)
in their respective bibliographies. While there is a significant difference in interpretation by
sample, it focuses on a type I critique. For Dinda (2004:446) Stern and Common (2001) appear in
the section "Is the EKC valid both for individual countries and the world?" where he considers the
important contribution of the reference to be having provided evidence that "[t]he results of
panel countries and that of individual or sub-sample countries vary widely." In other words, Stern
and Common (2001) provide evidence that the EKC may not be valid both for individual countries
and the world. In Stern (2004:1424,1429), Stern and Common (2001) appear in the sections
"Result of EKC Studies" and "Econometric Critique of the EKC". For Stern, the significance of his
earlier article is that it provides evidence that when the sample is augmented to include the lower
income ranges of non-OECD countries, the estimated turning point for the sulfur data rises
spectacularly. By way of reference, recall that the original Grossman and Krueger (1995) study
estimated a turning point around $4000 for sulfur emissions. Stern and Common's (2001) study
estimates an out-of-sample turning point of just over $100,000. Hence, for Stern (2004) the
important point is that EKC studies suffer from omitted variable bias.

Both of these

interdisciplinary articles give the citation a slightly different emphasis, but capture the same
strong critique of the EKC hypothesis.
Copeland and Taylor (2004:20) summarize Stern and Common (2001) in a single sentence:
they "use data on sulfur emissions in 73 countries over 31 years, and by comparing OECD and
non-OECD subsamples conclude that the evidence does not support a common EKC across
countries." It appears in the much more general section "Growth and the Environment". Now,
while their interpretation certainly isn't untrue, there is a notable difference in saying that Stern
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and Common's (2001) study doesn't support a common EKC across countries and saying that once
the omitted variables are included, the relation practically disappears. Without this latter piece
of information, one might easily conclude that there is nothing terribly significant in the variation
of EKCs across countries and that the relation more or less exists with statistically acceptable
levels of variance. This is certainly interesting, but if we want to consider this as being evidence
of anything it should be noted that this is not a conflict of a type II critique concerned with the
measurement of “environmental quality”, but centers on a type I critique concerning the omitted
variable bias of low-income countries.
Turning to the second example, again we don't find anything too spectacular. Dinda
(2004), Stern (2004), and Copeland and Taylor (2004) also all include Arrow et al. (1995) in their
lists of references. Here we almost find some qualitative evidence of a divergence in type II critical
thought. For Dinda (2004:447) one of the key points of the Arrow et al. (1995) is included in his
article's section "Does the EKC follow a sustainable development path?". Referencing Arrow et
al. (1995), he concludes: "There is no guarantee that the rising part and top of the EKC bypass
ecological thresholds and sustainability constraints beyond which environmental deterioration is
irreversible." Similarly, in Stern (2004:1426) this ecological aspect of Arrow et al. (1995) is also
recognized: "The key criticism of Arrow et al. (1995) and others was that the EKC model...assumes
that there is no feedback for environmental damage to economic production as income is
assumed to be an exogenous variable....In other words, there is an assumption that the economy
is sustainable." However, in Copeland and Taylor (2004:20), Arrow et al. (1995) appears only in
footnote 30 following a discussion on the role of international markets. The section title is, again,
the much more general "Growth and the Environment". The significant point they reference from
Arrow et al. (1995) --which also appears in Dinda (2004) and Stern (2004)--is that if the EKC results
from the displacement hypothesis and not income effects, then it couldn't be a universal
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phenomenon available to rich and poor countries alike. These differences in interpretation are
rather extreme as the former highlights that existing EKCs models determine their hypothesized
conclusion by excluding the possibility of environmental feedback.
Now this omission is not as severe as it may at first appear. After all, Copeland and Taylor
do introduce a model that endogenously links real income (R) with pollution (Z). While it may
seem curious that they should omit reference to Arrow et al.'s (1995) influential role in
highlighting a critique central to their own intervention, I do not believe there is anything here
which significantly contributes to my original question.
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APPENDIX B:
Tables
Table 1: Articles from Top 10 Journals

Articles from Top 10 Journals
Journal:
Journal of Economic Literature

Rank:
1st

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Impact Factor: Articles:
Citations:
6.341
Zheng and Kahn (2013)
2
Graff-Zivin and Neidell (2013)
2
Kitzmueller et al. (2012)
10
Copeland and Taylor (2004)
81
4.23
Toll (2009)
68
Dasgupta et al. (2002)
90
Esty (2001)
16
Portney (2000)
4

4th

Table 2: Articles from Interdisciplinary Sample

Articles from Interdisciplinary Sample
Journal:
Journal of Env Econ and Management
Ecological Economics

Rank: Impact Factor: Articles:
32nd
2.522
33rd

World Development

62nd

Citations:

Stern and Common (2001)

133

Soytas and Sari (2009)
Zhang and Cheng (2009)
Soytes et al. (2007)
Cole (2004)
Dinda (2004)
York et al. (2003)

105
117
128
104
279
162

Stern (2004)

401

2.517

1.733

Table 3: Distribution of Critiques by Sample
Distribution of Critiques by Sample
Top-ten Journals:
Zheng and Kahn (2013)
Graff and Neidell (2013)
Copeland and Taylor (2004)
Dasgupta et al. (2002)
Esty (2001)

Regulations Type I
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Type II

Interdisciplinary Journals:
Soytas and Sari (2009)
Zhang and Cheng (2009)
Soytas et al. (2007)
Stern (2004)
Cole (2004)
Dinda (2004)
York et al. (2003)
Stern and Common (2001)
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

Table 4: Ratio of Environmental Journal Reference to non-Environmental Journal References
York et al. (2003)
30
0.65
6
14
0.30
0.47

Dinda (2004)
119
0.66
15
79
0.44
0.66

Stern (2004)
73
0.72
16
42
0.41
0.58

Interdisciplinary Sample with Type II Critiques

Copeland and Taylor (2004)
94
0.65
9
24
0.17
0.26

pages

0.07
4.96
3.00

"pollution"

0.93
5.04
1.65

"environmental quality" etc.*

0.60
1.38
0.45

"indicators"

1.33
0.17
0.00

"ecology"

Zheng and Kahn (2013)
154
0.71
22
31
0.14
0.20

"ecology"

15
24
20

Dasgupta et al. (2002)
48
0.58
8
25
0.30
0.52

Mainstream Sample without Type II Critiques

Ratio of Environmental Journal References to non-Environmental Journal References by Sample Articles

Number of Journal References:
Ration of Journal Referennces to Total References:
Number of Unique Environmental Journals Refrenced:
Total Number of References from Environmental Journals:
Ratio of Environmental Journal Articles to Total References:
Ratio of Evnironmental Journal Articles to Total Jounral Articles:

"indicators"

20
4
0

Frequency of Select Terms
"environmental quality" etc.*

9
33
9

ratio of terms to pages

"pollution"

14
121
33

0.00
0.03
0.75
9.44
64
0
2
48
604
0.00
0.10
1.14
6.95
21
0
2
24
146
0.07
0.22
0.56
3.44
41
3
9
23
141
* in addition to "quality" the following terms are included: degradation, pressure, improvement, impact, consequences, harm, outcomes, damage, risks, concerns, hazards

1
119
60

incidence of terms

Table 5: Frequency of Selected Terms

Interdisciplinary Sample:
York et al. (2003)
Dinda (2004)
Stern (2004)
Mainstream Sample:
Copeland and Taylor (2004)
Dasgupta et al. (2002)
Zheng and Kahn (2013)
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